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1. INTRODUCTION
Since Coase economists asked the question: what determines boundaries of a firm? What is the
driving force behind numerous mergers, acquisitions, split-ups, spin-offs, i.e. various structural
changes observed in a real economy? Different theories were developed to explain these processes:
monopoly power, technological explanation, market size and industry life cycle, uncertainty and
risk and, of course, transaction cost theory.
In conditions of planned economy in the former Soviet Union size and boundaries of the firm were
determined by very different considerations. Not the “invisible hand” of market but central planning
institutions decided where to put a plant, what and how much it should produce and where the
product should go. Designed in such a way, Soviet industrial structure wasn’t fit to the conditions of
market economy.
During the last decade Russian industrial sector has undergone most dramatic changes. In the
course of “perestroika” and subsequent reforms industrial output had fallen by 40-60% in different
sectors. At the same time we witnessed huge wave of reorganizations: split-ups, spin-offs, mergers
and acquisitions. Firms adjusted their boundaries according to new economic conditions. First of
all, the collapse of planned economy and Soviet Union triggered massive breakup of large Soviet
enterprises. It is a well-known fact that many Soviet enterprises were oversized. Obviously, such
inefficient organizations could not survive in new economic conditions when state distribution of
resources has gradually ceased. This process coupled with mass privatization of 1992-1994 gave
rise to a wave of split-ups and spin-offs.
At the same time, the opposite tendency to integration has occurred. In absence of efficiently
functioning resource and product markets and in conditions of general economic instability
enterprises had to integrate with their suppliers and buyers in order to reconstruct production chains.
The same can be said about reconstruction of production connections broken up by the collapse of
Soviet Union. Horizontal integration in order to increase market power also takes place, especially
among firms, which obtained access to export markets. A lot was already said and written about
vertically integrated firms in oil industry and other natural resource sectors, similar trend recently
emerged in food industry and agriculture [17], [18]. Other sectors are no exceptions.
Consequently, the perception is that Russian firms reshaped their boundaries dramatically. It is
important to understand fundamental features and consequences of this process. The first goal of
this paper is to derive general patterns of boundary change in Russian industrial sector.
Second, I seek to identify the factors influencing firm’s decision to integrate or split up based
on modern theory of a firm. In particular, I test the factors of vertical integration suggested
by transaction cost theory. Finally, the attempt is made to estimate the effect of structural
change on firm performance, in particular, on productivity. This is an empirical paper. I use
data from the recent survey of Russian manufacturing enterprises. This is very rich dataset, which
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gives vast opportunities for high quality research. Up to the moment there was no extensive
empirical study of the reorganizations of Russian firms covering all industrial sectors. Current
research is intended to fill this gap.
2. SURVEY OF LITERATURE
When analyzing Russian industrial enterprises, the point to start is Soviet industrial structure. The
attempts to study it were made by Western economists as early as in 50-s, using very scarce
information available at that time (see Berliner [1]). Lately, a lot of studies were devoted to the
characteristics of Soviet industrial structure in conditions of what Kornai calls “shortage economy”.
According to Kornai [13], Soviet industrial production was highly monopolized and concentrated
due to specific features of planned economy. Large enterprises were in a stronger position to
bargain over distribution of subsidies and resources. From the point of view of central planner it
was easier to manage small number of large production units. Besides, enterprises themselves had
incentive to vertically integrate because of the disruptions in the delivery of inputs. Consequently,
they suffered from diseconomies of scale and inefficient parts of production were often cross-
subsidized inside large firms.
At the same time Brown et al. [3] argue that it was not high degree of monopolization but rather
high degree of segmentation, barriers to competition and absence of small firms that were
characteristic of industrial structure. Blanchard and Kremer [4] discuss another feature of planned
economy, namely, high degree of specificity in relations among firms. Indeed, many firms were
dependent on a single supplier or customer. This interdependency of firms coupled with complexity
of production processes opens room for adverse effects of specificity vastly studied in economic
literature (we’ll come back to this later).
With the beginning of transition complex system of economic relations started to disintegrate.
Established production chains and bargaining mechanisms broke down. High degree of specificity
inherited from Soviet period only worsened the negative effects of what Blanchard and Kremer call
“disorganization” of transition, first of all, significant fall of output in many sectors of production.
Process of disorganization was accompanied by massive breakups of former monopolies. In a spirit
of Schumpeter’s idea of “creative destruction” (Schumpeter [15]) we can inquire whether
disintegration of old industrial structure opened room for new, more effective organizational forms.
Similar tendencies occurred in other transition economies. Lizal et al. in their study of breakups of
Czechoslovakian state owned firms [14] and Macedonian firms [8] stress the role of  interaction
between different goals and interests of the parties to the process, namely, government,
management and workers. In the first study Lizal et al. analyze the efficiency effects of firms’
breakups in Czechoslovakia. They look at different measures of firm performance and estimate
effect of split-up separately on master enterprise and on subsidiary. Basic result is that “the effect is
positive for small values of spin-offs and declines with the size of the spin-off and the estimated
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effects are similar for the spun off subsidiaries and the remaining master enterprises.” In case of
Macedonia authors find that breakups were mostly explained by managerial self-interests as
opposed to efficiency considerations. This argument is also relevant for Russia because managers of
Russian firms inherited huge power from socialist period; hence, their interests as well as interests
of state are pivotal to the decision to reorganize.
It is important to understand how Russian firms solve the problem of specificity inherited from
Soviet period. Obviously, such mechanisms as competition, reputation, different kinds of contracts,
do not work properly in conditions of transition economy. Another solution is vertical integration.
This mechanism was vastly studied by transaction costs theory, which originated from Coase’s
seminal paper (Coase [5]). Oliver Williamson [16] in his book provided three main conditions for
vertical integration. First, basic assumption of transaction costs theory is that contracts are
incomplete meaning that it is impossible or prohibitively costly to write down all contingencies of
future transactions in all possible states of the world. Thus, virtually any contract is incomplete due
to uncertainty and costs of acquiring information. Second condition is opportunistic behavior of
parties to the contract that may arise when the third condition is present – namely, asset specificity.
Asset specificity, as defined by Williamson, is a characteristic of asset that is used in production of
some specific product and its re-deployment for other production purposes is very costly or if sold
to another producer it loses most part of its value. Such asset is basically locked in relation with
specific producer or specific type of production process. It is clear, that asset specificity is a
measure of degree: asset may be more or less specific depending on the relative costs of its re-
deployment.
In absence of asset specificity arms-length contracting across the market between producers would
be efficient enough. Competition among suppliers and buyers of non-specific asset insures that
costs of incomplete contracting (re-negotiation and disputes on unforeseen contingencies) are
minimized. As soon as asset specificity arises, parties are effectively tied into bilateral relation and
thus exposed to hazards of incomplete contracting. Solution to the problem is to integrate stages of
production tied by asset specificity within one firm. General prediction of transaction cost theory is
that in case of high degree of asset specificity vertical integration will be preferred to market
contractual relation. This is very important efficiency explanation of vertical integration, which
nevertheless has its critics, as we will see later.
Williamson [16] also discussed limits to integration, such as increased bureaucracy and costs
associated with it and weakened individual incentives. Another advantage of market organization
versus integration is that “markets are often able to aggregate diverse demand, thereby to realize
economies of scale and scope”.
Property rights theory developed by Hart, Grossman and others extends transaction costs theory
argument. This approach employs cost and benefit analysis and bargaining theory to "explain what
changes when two firms merge". Grossman and Hart [10] prove theoretically that distribution of
surplus anticipated from different ownership arrangements influences firms' investment incentives
and hence costs and benefits of integration. Firm, which obtains ownership rights (defined as
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residual rights over assets) will have incentive to overinvest while the other party that looses control
will underinvest. The basic conclusion from the analysis is that property right over the asset should
belong to the party who has more productive investment decision. The second conclusion is that
«highly complementary assets should be under common ownership” which is consistent with
Williamsonian hypothesis of asset specificity.
One of the economists who analyzed Williamson’s theory of vertical integration from the critical
point of view was Demsetz [7]. According to him, transaction cost theory over-estimated the
importance of opportunistic behavior and "became too narrowly focused on hold-up problem and
the role of asset specificity". Demsetz estimates empirically impact of asset specificity on vertical
integration. Results of his estimation do not confirm Williamsonian hypothesis. Moreover, results
show in some cases negative (though weak) relation between asset specificity and vertical
integration. General conclusion of Demsetz is that relationship between vertical integration and
asset specificity is ambiguous.
Quite convincing objection to Williamson’s theory is provided by practice, namely, by occurring
trend towards disintegration, outsourcing, contracting out [12]. Many economists argue that the
problem of contractual incompleteness, which is fundamental for Williamson’s explanation of
vertical integration, can be mitigated by using different types of contracts. Hart [11] explains trend
towards disintegration by increased technological flexibility. Consequently, it is important to
understand whether patterns of changes of industrial structure in Russia are similar to that in other
transition economies as well as to global trends in developed market economies.
 Thus, the process of changing boundaries of the firms was vastly studied in theoretical economics,
though much less so in implication to transition economies. We can apply rich theoretical material
surveyed to the analysis of reorganizations of Russian firms.
3. FACTORS OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE: HYPOTHESES
3.1. Organizational factors
As we have seen from literature survey many economists consider transaction costs as the main
driving force of integration. In context of Russian transition economy arguments of transaction
costs theory are especially relevant. In conditions of weak contract enforcement, non-transparent
legal system and general economic instability hold-up problem is more likely to arise. Examples are
abundant throughout. That is why Russian firms should have strong incentive to integrate according
to transaction cost theory.
Measuring transaction costs is however tricky. Further I suggest several determinants, which should
capture the scope of transaction costs for each firm.
Specificity/complexity. As we already discussed, this factor is very important since assets of
former Soviet enterprises were often very specific. In conditions of planned economy they were
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produced and supplied by specialized plant (often only one) and it was hard to find substitute. Thus,
many enterprises were tied to their suppliers. This interdependency is likely to remain for many
enterprises till now as they lack investments to buy new equipment and have to sustain their old
highly specific assets.
The problem is that it is very difficult to actually measure degree of asset specificity. Demsetz in his
earlier mentioned article used amount of investments in durable goods as a proxy. Another
possibility is to look at innovation activity of a firm. Firm that had some innovation is likely to
produce a specific good which is not produced elsewhere. More general approach is to use industry-
level measures. Blanchard and Kremer [2] in their study constructed industry-level indices of
complexity of production process, which should also capture asset specificity to an extent.
Lock-in effect. By lock-in effect I mean degree of dependency of a firm on certain supplier or
customer. The higher is this dependency the higher is the possibility of opportunistic behavior on
the behalf of this partner the higher is incentive to integrate. Again, measuring lock-in effect is
complicated. The degree of vertical dependency between supplier and customer may be captured by
concentration of input and product markets.
I also use indirect measures of lock-in effect. This variable indicates whether firm was able to
switch to new suppliers during 1990-1998. Presumably, firms locked in the relationship with old
suppliers couldn’t easily switch to new ones. Until recently non-monetary payments were
significant phenomenon in Russian industry. Barter necessarily leads to high degree of specificity in
relations between firms involved. Hence, share of barter payments may also proxy for lock-in
effect.
3.2. Market structure factors
In the beginning of 90-ies markets were liberalized and opened for competition. However, initial
market structure was not formed by competitive forces - it was inherited from planned economy.
This interaction between exogenously given structure and economic liberalization inevitably should
have influenced the behavior of firms. To account for the pre-reform market structure I use
measures of concentration/competition. Additional measures of competition are export potential and
import penetration.
3.3. Governance factors
Russian firms very actively split up or spun off during privatization and afterwards. It is well
documented fact that Russian managers were very powerful players at that stage. Their interests
influenced to a large extent the way privatization was carried out. Consequently, it can be argued
that managers were pivotal to the decision to split up or spin off, especially in the earlier years of
reforms. I proxy interests of managers by the size of managerial ownership stake. Corporate
governance literature shows that share ownership provides incentives for manager to maximize
value of a firm though the effect is non-linear (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988).
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3.4. Size and productivity of a firm
Finally, I control for pre-reorganization size and labor productivity of a firm. Productivity
(measured as a deviation from industry level) should proxy for the profit potential of a firm. Ideally,
we would like to estimate separately profit potential of the master enterprise and its subsidiary but it
is impossible due to unavailability of data.
4. DATA DESCRIPTION AND SAMPLE STATISTICS
The survey of Russian industrial enterprises which I use in my research has started several years
ago with background research and pilot studies and was actually carried out in the years 1999-2000.
The survey was funded by TACIS ACE, the Ruben Rausings Foundation, the MacArthur
Foundation, and the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation. It comprises 530 enterprises from
different sectors and regions. Special attention was paid to the sampling technique. Our solution to
the problem of regional and intra-regional sample selection was to piggyback on the sampling
strategy of a household survey, the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS). The RLMS
employs a multistage probability sample, starting from a list of 2029 rayons serving as Primary
Sample Units (PSU). Moscow City, Moscow Oblast, and St. Petersburg City were included with
certainty (self-representing strata), while other non-self representing rayons were allocated into 35
equally sized strata. Then 35 rayons were chosen (one from each stratum) with a probability
proportional to rayon’s size. The target sample was constructed in accordance with the proportion
of urban and rural population sizes and ethnic composition (if it was significant). Villages in rural
and districts in urban areas served as Second-Stage Units (SSU). Within these areas, dwellings were
enumerated and then drawn randomly from a list. One of the little-known aspects of the RLMS is
that workers are asked several open-ended questions about the nature of their jobs and employers.
In examining the string variables containing those answers, we found that nearly every worker,
particularly those employed in manufacturing firms, at one time or another reported the exact name
of his or her employer. Our sample consists of the list of these employers. Thus, if the RLMS
sample of households is a national probability sample, then our enterprise sample is a national
probability sample of manufacturing firms in Russia, drawn with a probability proportional to
employment.
RLMS sampling procedure ensured the sample representativeness with respect to geographical and
ethnic factors (for large ethnic groups) and level of urbanization. Thus our sample properly
represents the enterprises employing Russian people. Large firms were more likely to appear in our
sample, because a person in Russia is more likely to work for a large firm. Our sample is biased
towards large firms, just as the economy itself is biased towards them.
Let’s turn to a description of the sample characteristics by industry, region and size (always bearing
in mind that the sample was not designed to represent the true composition). The aim here is to
assess the structure of the sample relative to the population estimates available from official
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sources, namely Goskomstat statistical yearbooks, which may also suffer from problems of
reliability.
Graph 1 shows the distribution of firms by industry for Goskomstat “population” in 1998 and for
the sample. The sample appears to be weighted towards firms in the electricity and fuel sectors,
while the wood sector is under-represented compared to the Goskomstat figures.
Perhaps because the RLMS sampling procedure contained explicit stratification by region, the
sample and population proportions are more closely aligned along this dimension. Graph 2 shows
the distribution of the number of firms by region. The North-West region is over-represented, Far
East is under-represented, while other regions appear to be represented rather accurately.
Let’s look also at the distribution of firms by size (where size is measured as industrial employment) at
Graph 3. Our sample is indeed notably weighted towards large firms. If we look at the employment
distribution by size (Graph 4), we also see that small firms are under-represented. One of the reasons
could be the difficulty we met with finding small firms that were not in the registry, as we did not have
address information for them. Small firms are also more likely to have been liquidated.
The sample that I use in my analysis consists of 497 firms, which originated and existed in some
form before 1986. Sample statistics for this reduced sample – size, industry and ownership
distribution - is presented in Appendix 2.
Survey covers virtually every aspect of enterprise activity. One part of it contains standard
statistical and accounting information which firms report to statistical offices. Another part of
questionnaire was designed to trace the evolution of the firm since 1986: its origins, changes in
organizational and legal form, ownership structure, and corporate governance mechanisms.
Special part of questionnaire was devoted to reorganizations which firm has undergone in last
fifteen years. This is where I can get information about type of reorganization, time when it
occurred and the size of resulting employment change. In the Appendix 1 I present this part of the
questionnaire.
5. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
5.1. Case studies
Before starting formal analysis it is useful to study particular cases of firm reorganizations. Examples
will help to better understand the nature of structural changes of Russian firms as they allow to trace
history of a firm, specific factors and conditions influencing its structural changes and consequences of
these changes. Below I describe two cases when firms underwent multiple reorganizations.
1. Brick plant
The plant produces construction ceramics (bricks). During Soviet period the plant was subordinated
to the ministry of construction materials. In 1990 the plant employed 170 employees.
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Reorganizations. In September 1991 the plant went to a lease and became a cooperative. In
December 1992 it was privatized by the second option (sale of 51 percent of voting shares to the
work collective). By 1994 80 percent of the plant was owned by insiders (20 percent - managers, 60
percent - workers). However, during that period financial condition of the firm deteriorated, plant
accumulated large wage and tax arrears (in 1994 80 percent of workers had wage arrears).
In April 1997 the firm merged (was acquired) with local private construction firm. In October 1998
the firm spun off another firm. This new firm obtained all the production facilities of the plant. Old
firm exists only formally, as a shell firm, but it inherited all the debts of the plant. New firm is now
wholly owned by two managers of the construction firm.
Performance. After several years of having negative profit the firm was making positive profits in
1998 and 1999. It employed 100 employees in 1998 and 124 in 1999. All wage arrears were paid
off by 1998 though significant part of wage is still paid in kind. Labor productivity, which was
falling until 1994, then started to increase and in 1998 it was 16 percent higher than in 1992.
This is a clear case of vertical integration when firm merged with its customer and benefited from it.
It is not clear however how organizational factors contribute to the integration. Brick production
obviously does not entail much of specificity. Spin-off was not a real change of firm’s boundaries.
It was used as an instrument to improve firm’s financial condition and get rid of the debt.
2. Flax company
The plant produces flax. During soviet period the plant was subordinated to the ministry of
textile industry. In 1990 the plant employed 1198 employees, of which 341 in non-production
sector.
Reorganizations. In August 1991 the plant was leased by its employees. In June 1992 it was
privatized through auction and became a partnership. By 1994 92 percent of the firm was owned by
its employees (50 percent - managers, 42 percent - workers). In 1995 the firm was reorganized into
open joint stock company.
In August 1997 two enterprises span off from the firm. One is textile company (fire-hose
production), second one is “kotelnaya” (boiler-house of a flax company). As a result, employment
in the firm” reduced by 10 percent.
In June 1998 the firm further split up into two parts. As a result of split-up, employment of a main
successor reduced by 30 percent. Ownership structure of the firm didn’t change significantly; in
1999 flax company was still owned by current or former workers of flax company.
Currently all four parts of a former enterprise joined into a holding and continue working together.
Performance. As a result of reorganizations number of employees reduced from 1198 in 1990 to
169 in 1998. Most of non-production divisions (housing, polyclinics, kindergartens) were closed or
spun off. At the same time labor productivity measured as a ratio of real sales to employment
reduced almost 10 times from 1992 to 1997. During the whole period of 1991-1998 enterprise had
wage arrears and starting from 1994 increasing share of wage bill was paid in kind. Share of non-
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monetary payments for materials and sales increased from 5 percent in 1994 to 80 percent in 1998.
Thus, performance and financial condition of the firm deteriorated.
In this case governance factors could play a role in splitting the firm up. Manager keeping 50
percent of shares may have an interest in shedding unprofitable divisions of a firm. At the same
time, the fact that performance deteriorated after reorganization may imply that manager is more
interested in acquiring private benefits than in increasing the value of his ownership stake.
5.2. Deciphering reorganizations
As examples above show, reorganizations are quite heterogeneous in nature – it may be real
division or combining of assets or it may be, for example, an instrument of transfer of assets from a
firm under a threat of bankruptcy. Consequently, careful approach is needed in classifying
reorganizations. In the analysis I used not only data from the survey but also information from
Goskomstat enterprise registry (employment, name and address information) where possible. I
looked at every case of reorganization closely in order classify it properly.
Since I am using data from a survey, it is important to understand what questions were asked and
how respondents interpreted them. Types of reorganizations listed in the questionnaire (Appendix
1) are legal definitions, taken from Civil Code and JSC Law. Each of these reorganizations involves
change of a legal status of one or more participants. I am interested in reorganizations, which
involve change of legal boundaries of a firm. There are four of them: split-up, spin-off, merger and
acquisition. Note that survey was retrospective, that is, surveyed firm is only one part of some
former firm (in case of break-up) or it is a combination of several former firms (in case of
integration). In case of spin-off, surveyed firm may be either a firm which was spun-off and re-
registered as a new firm or it may be an old firm which span-off some part of it. So, in a question
we separate these two types of spin-offs. Further I will name them spin-off (new) and spin-off (old).
It is clear that reorganizations in our definition involve change of legal boundaries of a firm: either
one legal entity is separated into several new ones or several legal entities are joined in one.
However, what we are interested in is economic processes behind these legal changes. What
happened to physical assets of a firm, to its employment? Whether and how its sphere of activity
(products produced) changed? What part of production process was excluded or included into new
legal boundaries as a result of reorganization? Unfortunately, our data do not allow answering all of
these questions but survey asked two additional questions, which will allow us to better understand
underlying economic transformations. We asked how employment of a firm changed (increased, did
not change, decreased) and by how many percents, as a result of reorganization. This can tell us
something about change of economic (physical) boundaries of a firm.
Apparently, firms that underwent split-ups and spin-offs should report fall of employment; firms
that merged or acquired another firm should report rise of employment. However, this was not
always the case. Sometimes firms that underwent some kind of break-up report no corresponding
employment change. One possible explanation is that a firm was previously a member of
production association, trest, etc. – Soviet industrial associations which comprised large number of
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firms in a certain industry. Firm might report exit from this association as a break-up. Apparently,
exit from association was not accompanied by change of physical boundaries – it was still the same
production unit. Survey asked about old name of a firm back in 1986, similar variable exists in
Goskomstat registry. Using this information I was able to determine that out of 22 firms which had
break-ups and report no employment change, at least 12 were previously members of some
industrial associations. Another explanation comes from one of examples above – a break-up was
used as a way to transfer assets from a bankrupt firm, employment obviously didn’t change. Such
kinds of reorganizations also do not involve change of physical boundaries – same production unit
exists under new legal label.
As for cases of mergers and acquisitions with no employment change, they also can be explained.
Firm might join a holding, business group etc. – some group of firms or obtain some share in
another firm, but it remains and perceives itself as separate legal unit, hence, reports no change in
employment. Of course, joining a group or buying ownership share also means changing firm’s
boundaries to an extent since relations between members of a group differ from relations between
independent firms. Clearly, if we understand boundaries of a firm in somewhat broader sense than
just legal boundaries, of change in boundaries is a question of degree. Still, it’s clear that cases of
reorganizations with no employment change should be analyzed separately from others.
Also, there are few cases when break-up was accompanied by increase of employment or
integration resulted in decrease of employment. I exclude such cases from further analysis.
Result of methodological discussion above is a classification of types of reorganizations according
to legal definition, employment change and number of reorganizations on a single enterprise. It is
presented in Table 1. 57% percent of firms in my sample did not reorganize since 1986. Among
reorganized firms, for the purpose of further analysis I will mainly consider firms with one
reorganization and corresponding employment change (five types in bold letters in a table). At least,
these groups can be considered more or less homogenous1. Around 15% of all firms had several
reorganizations since 1986 – of different types in various combinations (for detailed statistics see
Table 2). I split them into three groups: firms only with break-ups, firms only with integrations and
firms with both types. Were possible, I will try to give statistics for these groups too, though it is
more difficult to interpret. Technical note: last column of Table 1 contains codes for types of
reorganizations. I will use them sometimes in further description for the sake of simplicity.
5.3. Reorganizations by time, industry and size
It is interesting to know how reorganizations were distributed in time. This can be seen from Graph
5 and Table 3 (for firms with only one reorganization – five major types). As we can see from the
table, while there were some mergers and split-ups before 1991, the process of adjustment of
                                                
1 Even inside these groups reorganizations may be quite different in nature. For example, merger may mean vertical
integration up-stream or down-stream, or horizontal integration or diversification. The same for split-ups.
Unfortunately, data do not allow to distinguish them.
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boundaries of the firms was most active during mass privatization in 1991-1994 and continued after
1994 with the peak in 1997. Note that the number of breakups is greater then the number of mergers
almost for all years. It shows that the process of unbundling was more active than the process of
integration even after the end of mass privatization, that is, former socialist enterprises were indeed
significantly oversized. Rise of integration activity started after 1993.
Industrial structure. Let’s see, how reorganizations went on in different industries. General
distribution is presented in Graph 6 and Table 4. In most industries as well as in whole sample 50-
60% firms did not have any reorganizations. Quite similar (and close to general picture – last
column) “bundle” and structure of reorganizations are observed in following industries:
construction materials, electricity, food processing, light, machine building. Firms in chemical
industry, forestry, non-ferrous metallurgy and oil extraction had relatively more spin-offs. Firms in
forestry and non-ferrous metallurgy reorganized more in general. Oil extraction industry firms in a
sample did not have any integrations. Clearly stand apart ferrous metallurgy and oil refining. Their
firms virtually did not reorganize; only one firm in each industry had reorganization with no
employment change.
More clearly industrial distribution of five main types of reorganizations can be seen on Graph 7. It
varies quite notably. Non-ferrous metallurgy disintegrated most actively. Also a lot of break-ups
happened in chemical industry, forestry, and oil extraction. Relatively more integrations compared
to other industries there were in construction materials, electricity, food processing, and forestry.
Three types of multiple reorganizations by industry can be seen at Graph 8. Some 6-14% of firms
almost in all industries underwent multiple changes of boundaries, both through break-ups and
integrations.
Finally, Graph 9 presents industrial structure of reorganizations with no employment change.
Largest category in almost all industries is spin-off (new), which might mean, as discussed above,
exit from production association or transfer of assets (or something else). Quite a lot of
integration without change of size is observed in construction materials, food processing, light
industry, machine building. High share of merger in oil refining is in fact one firm out of four in a
sample.
First conclusions that can be drawn from above analysis are following. Almost in all industries
process of reorganization was quite widespread, active and varied. Situation looks quite similar in
domestically oriented processing industries, while resource-based and exporting industries are
specific with respect to reorganizations. There were lots of reorganizations (nonferrous metallurgy)
as well as no “real” reorganizations at all (ferrous metallurgy and oil refining).
Employment change. Let’s now look at the scale of employment change, which accompanied
reorganizations. Were these just minor changes or were significant parts of firms in terms of
employment split up, spun off, merged or acquired? Table 5 shows detailed statistics on two
variables: size of firm (employment) in a year preceding year of reorganization and percentage
change of employment as a result of reorganization. (One caveat of such analysis is that it’s done
irrespective of year of reorganization – we summarize statistics across different years.)
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As can be see, firms changed their boundaries on a quite significant scale. For all types of
reorganizations, employment changed by more than 1/5 on average. In case of split-up, firms on
average reduced by almost one half. Interesting results come from the comparison of two types of
spin-offs. For the “type 20” firms employment has fallen by 33.5 % on average. This means that
2/3 of an old firm spun off and re-registered as a new firm. At the same time, firms of “type 30”
spun of on average 22% of employment. There may be several explanations. Since survey was
retrospective and only firms which survived to the moment of survey were able to get to the
sample, it looks like larger parts of broken-up firms (irrespective of whether they were “old” or
“new”) survived more often than smaller parts. Of course, since sample is initially weighted by
employment, larger firms had in general higher probability to get into the sample. Unfortunately,
we will not receive complete picture from this data, since we did not survey the whole population
of broken up firms. Still, it is clear that disintegrations went on a large scale - firms reduced their
size quite dramatically.
Scale of integration activity was also quite pronounced – firms merge on average with firms of
more than 60% of their size and acquired firms of 1/5 of their size.
When talking about size of firms, it’s important to remember that firms changed their employment
not only through reorganizations but also through lay-offs. Let’s look at the yearly dynamics of
employment for different types of firms, Graph 10 and Graph 11. In Graph 10 employment
numbers from registry are used (PPP) – they cover more years (since 1985) but have fewer
observations since I included observations where employment in 1985 is non-missing. Graph 11
was build using employment figures from survey (total employment, including non-production
divisions), properly cleaned. They have more observations and cover years 1990-1998.
Interestingly, both graphs show that firms which had one reorganization, whether break-up or
integration, were initially smaller than firms with no reorganizations. At the same time, non-
reorganized firms reduced their employment approximately with the same speed as split-up firms.
In firms that had merger or acquisition employment stayed almost unchanged during the whole
period. It means that layoffs where quite significant for all types of firms. Firms, which did not
change their boundaries through reorganizations, changed them by reducing number of employees.
Among firms with multiple reorganizations, at least firms with only breakups where initially
substantially larger than others and reduced their size dramatically. Still, by 1999 they were on
average larger than other types of firms.
6. FACTORS OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE: TESTING THE HYPOTHESES
6.1. Reorganizations
Summary statistics presented in the previous section shows that change of boundaries in Russian
industrial sector was a process of large scope and scale. However, descriptive statistics do not yet
explain the factors of reorganizations. Indeed, reorganizations took place in all industries, though
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with some differences. Variations in other characteristics also do not allow us to draw conclusions
about factors of reorganizations. In this section I test the hypotheses proposed earlier.
Description of variables that were proposed in section 3 as factors of reorganizations is presented in
Appendix 3 and Table 6 presents summary statistics. First of all, let’s look at means of variables by
type of reorganization in Table 6. There is variation in the average value of variables measuring
organizational factors (in particular for firms that had integration) though the direction of variation
is opposite to what initial hypotheses predict. In particular, integrated firms had much less
concentrated market for main input on average than non-reorganized firms while lock-in effect
hypothesis predicts the opposite effect. Also integrated firms can be found in the industries which
higher average level of competition measured by Herfindahl-Hirschman index, export dummy and
import penetration level. This implies that firms integrated with the purpose of limiting competition.
Governance factors show some variation as well, most notably, managerial ownership share is
much higher for the firms that had split-up or spin off.
In order to see whether these effects are significant I run regressions. Inclusion of all factors into
one regression is problematic since number of observations in each category, in particular for
integrations, is low; hence large number of variables reduces degrees of freedom significantly.
Instead, I run multinomial logit regression separately for each variable controlling for industry and
size of firm (measured by employment in 1990). Coefficients from multinomial logit regression (for
two types of reorganizations) and from probit (for all reorganizations pooled together) for each
variable are presented in Table 8. Among all the variables measuring the extent of specificity,
complexity and lock-in effect which would call for vertical integration only the dummy for new
supplier is significant for integrations. According to initial hypothesis ability to find new supplier
means that firm is not locked into a relation with old supplier, hence has less incentives to integrate.
The effect I find is however the opposite: ability to find new suppliers is positively correlated with
integration. However, the ability to find new supplier may be in turn by the same factors as the
incentives to integrate or disintegrate. In other words, finding new suppliers also in a way leads to
change in boundaries of a firms though in a weaker sense than change of legal boundaries.
Consequently the problem of endogeneity doesn’t allow us to rely on the result obtained.
 At the same time, the degree of complexity, concentration of input markets, barter and innovation
activity do not appear to be factors of reorganizations. This doesn’t mean that transaction cost
theory explanation for vertical integration is not working in transition economies. Since in my data
it is not possible to distinguish between vertical and horizontal integrations or disintegrations, the
effect of organizational factors may not show itself. In order to reveal the importance of
organizational factors I will look specifically at vertical integration in the next sub-section.
As for the market structure factors, the initial concentration on the product market decreases the
probability of integration. In other words, firms in more competitive markets integrate more,
probably in order to limit competition and gain monopoly power. On the other hand, firms facing
competition from imports are more likely to break up. Interpretation might be that firms competing
with import goods cut off inefficient divisions or downsize to an optimal size (evidence of
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oversized former soviet firms) in order to be able to face import competition. Thus, competition
with domestic firms leads to integration while competition with imports disciplines firms and leads
them to reduce the boundaries.
The most significant factor of reorganizations can be found among governance factors. The higher
managerial ownership stake leads to higher probability of break-up. Manager who holds ownership
stake in a firm has more incentives and/or more opportunities to reorganize a firm. In theory,
manager-owners have better incentives to increase firm value. Hence, these split-ups could be
value-enhancing, for example, manager could separate unprofitable parts of firm. However this
effect is non-linear and managers cares not only about value of a firm but also about private
benefits. Thus, through break-ups manager could separate the division with higher opportunities for
private benefits extraction. In order to better understand the role of managers let‘s look at
managerial turnover during and after reorganizations. Statistics is presented in a table.
Percent of firms where manager didn’t change
after reorganizationType of
reorganization
Percent of firms where
manager changed with
reorganization if changed with
reorganization
if didn't change with
reorganization
Total number of firms
Split-up 52.6 50.0 66.7 19
Spin-off (new) 50.0 58.3 66.7 28
Spin-off (old) 19.4 33.3 68.0 31
Merger 71.4 20.0 100.0 7
Acquisition 12.5 0.0 85.7 8
Total 37.6 53.2 72.2 133
Privatized firms that reorganized
between 1994 and 1999
Privatized firms that didn’t
reorganize
Managerial ownership in 1994 13.96 10.18
Managerial ownership in 1999 20.33 11.76
From the first panel we can see that in case of split-up or spin-off (new) manger changed in half of
the cases while in case of spin-off (old) manager changed only in 20 percent of firms. Merger is
associated with much higher rate of managerial turnover indicating that these could be hostile
takeovers while during acquisition managers changed rear. Importantly, managers who survived
reorganization were also more likely to stay in a firm afterwards meaning that they were more
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entrenched. In we compare managerial ownership for firms that reorganized between 1994 and
1999 with that of non-reorganized firm (second panel) we can see that managers of reorganized
firms both had higher ownership stake before reorganization and were able to increase it more
through reorganization. Thus, one of the reasons of reorganization might be the desire of manager
to increase his ownership stake in a firm. Manager holding on average 20 percent of a firm in 1999
doesn’t necessarily care about increasing the value of the firm but is entrenched enough to be able
to siphon value out of the firm or extract private benefits. This finding is consistent with the
findings from other transition economies (Czech Republic and Macedonia) about the important role
of managers in changing boundaries of the firms. The effect of reorganizations on firms’
performance is briefly discussed in the last section.
6.2. Vertical Integration
Factors suggested by transaction costs theory turned out to be insignificant for reorganizations. This
might be due to the fact that analysis of reorganization mixes together vertical and horizontal
integrations/disintegrations since data do not allow to distinguish them. In order to study the impact
of proposed factors on vertical integration specifically I in this section I take broader perspective. I
relax definition of boundaries of a firm as legal boundaries only and look at vertical integration
through ownership.
Ownership ties between firms started to form during and after mass privatization. Even though large
art of ownership was privatized to insiders outside firms could by some stakes in other firms
through tenders and auctions or accumulate stakes on the secondary market. Why did some firms
have chosen to buy an ownership stake in their suppliers or customers while other did not?
Transaction cost theory and property rights theory can help to answer this question.
The survey data contains information about ownership structure, in particular, the ownership stakes
and identity of outside blockholders (those who have 5 percent stake or more). Thus, for each firm in
a sample we know whether its supplier or customer held a stake in this firm. There are 39 firms in a
sample which had suppliers among blockholders and the average stake held by suppliers in 1999 is
34.4 percent. Among them 24 firms had suppliers holding more than 25 percent. Another 39 firms
were partly or fully owned by their customers. Average stake held by customers in 1999 in those
firms is 36 percent. Few firms were had both supplier and customer owners. Thus, more than 60 firms
in a sample had some degree of vertical integration, either with upstream or downstream firms.
In order to test the importance of organizational factors I run binomial probit with the dependent
variable being the dummy for presence of supplier or customer blockholder. Taking size of
ownership stake as the dependent variable instead produces similar results. I run the regressions
separately for suppliers and customers since different factors may affect upstream and downstream
integration. I control for industry and size and industry variation can also tell us something about
the factors of integration. The results of two regressions are presented in Table 9.
Most interesting results come from the regression for supplier blockholders. Most variables of
interest are significant but have opposite effect to the one predicted by the initial hypotheses.
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Complexity index has negative effect on probability of integration with supplier. I don’t have a
sound explanation for that. Concentration on input and product markets has negative effect on
probability of integration with supplier. Another hypothesis was that higher concentration on input
and product market would lead to higher degree of dependency between firms and possibility of
opportunism, hence, firms have higher incentive to integrate. However the observed effect is
opposite. Concentration on input and product markets has negative effect on probability of
integration with supplier (note that I am using gini coefficient to measure competition on product
market as it is highly significant while HHI is not). Firms on facing more competitive input and
product markets integrate more which may have a goal of limiting competition instead of
economizing on transaction costs.
On the other hand, presence of innovation activity in the firm measured by patents obtained has
significant positive effect on probability of integration with supplier. Having innovation patents
means that firm produces some kind of specific products not produced elsewhere. This is the only
firm-level measure of asset specificity available in my data. Firm that produces specific products
may behave opportunistically which calls for vertical integration. This is the only evidence from my
data confirming transaction cost theory hypothesis. Coefficients of the industry dummies show that
firms in metallurgy and construction materials industry have higher propensity to integrate with
suppliers.
Regression for customer blockholders has much lower explanatory power than previous one.
Presence of barter payments with customers has positive effect on integration which is in accord
with initial hypothesis though the size of effect is quite small. Contrary to previous equation
concentration on the product market has positive effect on integration with customers though it is
only marginally significant.
Summarizing, analysis of vertical integration shows that it was both a method to internalize
transaction costs arising from asset specificity and a way to reduce competitive pressure.
7. PERFORMANCE AFTER REORGANIZATIONS
Finally, let’s look at how performance of the firms was changing after reorganizations. Since our
firms are mostly non-traded firms, the most reliable measure of performance is labor productivity.
Profit figures are less reliable, besides, they are less reported, both in Goskomstat and in our
survey.
I conduct kind of event study, comparing (log of) labor productivity relative to industry average for
different types of reorganizations in a year before reorganization, year of reorganization and three
years after reorganization (Graph 12 is built for 36 firms which had these data).
In a year before reorganization, firms that were going to have a spin-off had significantly higher
relative productivity than all others. After the break-up all firms experience fall of productivity
relative to industry average. Only integrated firms increase their productivity to the pre-
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reorganization year. After that, all types of firms decrease their productivity. Among spin-off firms,
both master enterprises and subsidiaries (spin-off (old) and spin-off (new)) show similar trends.
Integrated firms perform relatively better; split-up firms have worst results. For comparison, labor
productivity relative to industry average for firms with no reorganizations was continuously falling
from 1991 to 1998 (Graph 13).
Finally, let’s compare productivity of firms at the end of observed period – in the year 1998.
Log of labor productivity in 1998
Deviation from industry average
(in logs) in 1998Types of
reorganizations
mean sd mean sd
Percent of firms where
labor productivity
exceeds industry
average
No reorganization 1.30 1.07 -1.09 1.13 14.48
Split-up 1.03 1.04 -1.12 0.52 12.50
Spin-off (new) 1.44 1.08 -0.70 0.99 20.00
Spin-off (old) 1.90 1.21 -0.63 1.09 21.05
M&A 1.87 0.59 -0.50 0.86 18.18
Several break-ups 0.88 1.11 -1.26 1.02 9.09
Both break-ups
and integrations 0.93 1.01 -1.17 1.14 12.50
Total 1.36 1.08 -1.02 1.10 15.33
Productivity of non-reorganized firms is close to sample average. Among all reorganization types,
better performing firms are those which had one integration and those which experienced spin-off
(both master and subsidiary, though master enterprises perform better than subsidiaries).
Importantly, this result doesn’t mean that after spin-offs both master enterprises and subsidiaries
performed better on average. It means that in our sample we captured better performing master
enterprises and better performing subsidiaries. Combined with the fact that our sample is biased
towards larger firms, this may lead to the conclusion that larger parts of spin-off firms performed
better. Variation in productivity is highest for master enterprises.
The worst performing firms in a sample are those which resulted from split-ups and those which
experienced several reorganizations. Note that according to regression results split-up firms had
lower productivity before reorganization as well. Thus, split-up did not help them to improve
performance.
Finally, if we pool all three types of break-ups together and compare labor productivity of these
firms with non-reorganized firms, statistical tests show that both mean and standard deviation of
labor productivity in 1998 for split-up or spin-off firms are significantly larger than those for non-
reorganized firms.
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8. CONCLUSIONS
The process of structural changes in firms’ boundaries is understudied since very little evidence is
actually available on this issue. Our data do not allow addressing all the questions of interest in this
respect, however, following conclusions can be drawn from above analysis:
• Reorganizations of Russian firms were heterogeneous in nature
• Firms changed their boundaries on a large scale – 40-50% of firms almost in all industries had
at least one reorganization since 1986. 15% of firms underwent multiple reorganizations.
• Due to the fact that Soviet firms were significantly oversized there were much more break-ups
than integrations.
• Reorganizations resulted in quite significant change of size of firms – employment changed on
average by more than 20 %
Based on a modern theory of a firm, I proposed several factors to determining reorganizations of
Russian firms, among them organizational, market structure and governance factors. Following
factors are found to be significant:
• Firms in less concentrated industries integrated more thus limiting competitive pressure from
domestic firms
• Firms facing strong competition from, imports disintegrated more; that is, competitive pressure
from import forced firms to downsize and spin off inefficient divisions.
• Firms where managers hold larger ownership stakes split up more; thus interests of managers
played very important role in reorganizations of Russian firms which is consistent with findings
for other transition economies.
Organizational factors turned out to be insignificant for reorganizations. The reason might be that
data do not distinguish between vertical and horizontal vertical reorganizations while the factors I
propose have to do with vertical relations between firms. I further test the importance of these
factors for vertical integration with suppliers and customers through ownership holding. I find that
complexity of production and concentration on input and product markets are negatively correlated
with integration with suppliers contrary to hypotheses suggested by organizational theory. At the
same time, asset specificity measured by innovation activity of a firm leads to more integration with
suppliers. This is the only evidence in support of transaction cost theory.
Finally, I attempted to study the effect of reorganizations on firm performance. Simple comparison
of labor productivity levels shows that this effect is not always positive. In our sample, firms
resulting from spin-offs (both master enterprises and subsidiaries) perform better than non-
reorganized firms. Integrated firms also perform better as well. At the same time firms resulting
from split-ups and from several reorganizations perform worse than non-reorganized firms. More
comprehensive analysis of the effect of reorganizations on firm performance is beyond the scope of
this paper and may become a subject of a separate study.
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APPENDICES, GRAPHS AND TABLES
A1. Questions asked about reorganizations
11-15. STARTING FROM 19[  ][  ] YEAR (READ YEAR FROM POSITION 1 OF THE
INSERT), LET'S TALK ABOUT REORGANIZATIONS OF YOUR ENTERPRISE, IN
CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER, STARTING WITH THE VERY FIRST ONE. /INTERVIEWER!
ASK QUESTIONS 11-15 FOR EVERY SUBSEQUENT REORGANIZATION./
# of reorganization
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th
11. type of reorganization
1. split-up 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2. merger (involves legal registration of a new legal
entity based on two or more predecessors)
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
3. spin-off, your enterprise is the one which spun off
and there was its legal registration as a new legal
entity
3 3 3 3 3 3 3
4. spin-off, your enterprise is the one from which an
enterprise was spun off and there was no legal re-
registration of your enterprise
4 4 4 4 4 4 4
5. acquisition 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
6. reorganization of legal entity of one type to another
type (change of legal form) without any of the
above changes
6 6 6 6 6 6 6
7. other, please enlist 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
12. in what year did this reorganization happen? 19_ _ 19_ _ 19_ _ 19_ _ 19_ _ 19_ _ 19_ _
13. in what, approximately, month did this
reorganization happen?
 __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __
14. as a result of this reorganization did the number of
employees increase, did not change, or decrease?
1. increase 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2. did not change 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
3. decrease 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
4. difficult to say 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
15. By how many percent did the employment
increase/decrease only because of this
reorganization (take the number of employees
before this reorganization as 100%)
% % % % % % %
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A2. Summary Statistics for the Sample of 497 Firms
Size Distribution of Firms in a Sample (percents)
Years
Number of employees
1990 1994 1998
Less then 100 5.83 7.65 16.14
100-249 12.94 19.79 19.52
250-999 29.45 27.70 31.33
1000-9999 42.07 38.79 29.16
More than 10000 9.71 6.07 3.86
Total number of firms 309 379 415
Distribution of Firms by Industry
Industry Percent
Chemical 5.03
Coal 0.40
Construction materials 7.04
Electricity 7.65
Ferrous metallurgy 2.21
Food processing 14.08
Forestry 5.03
Fuel 0.20
Gas 0.20
Light 9.66
Machine building 38.03
Non-ferrous metallurgy 2.01
Oil extraction 0.80
Oil refining 0.80
Other 6.84
Total number of firms 497
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Distribution of Firms by Ownership Type (percents)
Year
Ownership category
1994 1999
100% state 23.14 16.08
Majority state 7.21 6.19
Majority private 25.98 16.29
100% private,
    of which: 43.45 61.24
    Majority insider 32.31 31.96
    Majority outsider 10.04 27.84
    Number of firms 458 485
A3. Variable Description
Complex is Blanchard and Kremer’s industry-level complexity/specificity index (square root of
sum of squared shares of inputs in production).
New_supplier is a dummy equal to 1 if a firm had “new” suppliers (those who were not suppliers in
1990) in 1994 or 1998, 0 if 100% were old suppliers both in1994 and 1998.
Barter94 is the share of non-monetary payments in sales in 1994
Patent98 is the dummy variable indicating if firm received any patents in 1998
Emp_log90(98) is the logarithm of number of employees in 1990 (1998)
Laborpro90 is labor productivity in 1990
Labpro_logdif90 is equal to: log of firm labor productivity in 1990 minus log of industry average
labor productivity in 1990 (labor productivity is measured as the ratio of real output to employment)
Profit92 – profit to output ratio in 1992
Manager_sh94 is share of manager in firm’s ownership in 1994, in percents
State_sh94 is share of state in firm’s ownership in 1994, in percents
Export is a dummy equal to 1 if a firm was exporting its products in 1990, 1994 or 1998, and 0
otherwise.
Import – import penetration measured by the share of import in the industry averaged over years
1993 to 1999
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Hhi90 is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (sum of squared output shares of each firm in the
industry) for the five-digit industry at the national level in 1990 2.
Gini97 is the gini coefficient for firms’ size distribution (measured by employment) for the five-
digit industry at the national level in 1997.
Hhi_input92(96) is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index for the five-digit industry at the national level
in which firm’s main input is produced. (In a survey we asked respondent to name an input (among
raw materials) which has highest share in costs of production. Classifying these inputs into 5-digit
industries, it is possible to measure degree of competition on the market for the firm’s main input.)
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2 HHI and GINI were constructed by Brown and Earle [4].
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 26
Graph 2 
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Graph 4
Distribution of Industrial Employment by Size
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Table 1. Classification of Reorganizations.
Type of reorganization
Number of
firms
Percent of
firms
Code of
reorganization
No reorganization 285 57.34 0
One split-up, employment decreased 19 3.82 10
One split-up, employment did not change 1 0.20 11
One spin-off (surveyed firm is the one which spun off and
there was its legal registration as a new legal entity),
employment decreased 30 6.04 20
One spin-off (surveyed firm is the one which spun off and there
was its legal registration as a new legal entity), employment did
not change 18 3.62 21
One spin-off (surveyed firm is the one which spun off and there
was its legal registration as a new legal entity), employment
increased 5 1.01 22
One spin-off ( surveyed firm is the one from which a firm was
spun off and there was no legal re-registration of surveyed
firm), employment decreased 31 6.24 30
One spin-off ( surveyed firm is the one from which a firm was
spun off and there was no legal re-registration of surveyed firm),
employment did not change 3 0.60 31
 One spin-off ( surveyed firm is the one from which a firm was
spun off and there was no legal re-registration of surveyed firm),
employment increased 2 0.40 32
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Type of reorganization
Number of
firms
Percent of
firms
Code of
reorganization
One merger (involves legal registration of a new legal entity
based on two or more predecessors), employment increased 7 1.41 40
One merger (involves legal registration of a new legal entity
based on two or more predecessors), employment did not change 4 0.80 41
One merger (involves legal registration of a new legal entity
based on two or more predecessors), employment decreased 3 0.60 42
One acquisition, employment increased 8 1.61 50
One acquisition, employment did not change 4 0.80 51
One acquisition, employment decreased 3 0.60 52
Several split-ups and spin-offs 29 5.84 60
Several mergers and acquisitions 3 0.60 70
Several split-ups, spin-offs, mergers and acquisitions 42 8.45 80
   Total 497 100.00
Table 2. Firms with several reorganizations.
Number of reorganizations in one firm
Split-up
Spin-off
(new)
Spin-off
(old)
Merger Acquisition
Total number of
reorganizations in one
firm
Number of firms of this
type
2 2 3
2 2 4
2 2 5
2 2 1
3 3 3
3 3 1
1 1 2 6
1 1 2 1
1 1 2 5
1 1 1 3 1
1 2 3 1
2 2 4 1
1 3 4 1
1 1 2 1
1 1 2 5
1 1 2 5
1 1 2 5
1 1 2 5
1 1 2 4
1 1 2 8
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Number of reorganizations in one firm
Split-up
Spin-off
(new)
Spin-off
(old)
Merger Acquisition
Total number of
reorganizations in one
firm
Number of firms of this
type
1 1 1 3 3
1 2 3 1
1 1 1 3 1
2 1 3 1
1 1 1 3 1
2 1 3 1
1 1 1 3 1
2 1 1 4 1
4 1 1 6 1
1 3 2 6 1
Graph 5
Number of Reorganizations (for firms with only one reorganisation)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99
Year
N
um
be
r o
f r
eo
rg
an
is
at
io
ns
/fi
rm
s
Split-up (type 10)
Spin-off (new) (type 20)
Spin-off  (old) (type 30)
Merger (type 40)
Acquisition (type 50)
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 30
Table 3. Number of Reorganizations by Year.
Type of reorganizationYear of
reorganization 10 11 20 21 22 30 31 32 40 41 42 50 51 52
1986 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
1987 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1988 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
1989 0 0 2 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1990 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1991 6 0 3 2 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1992 3 0 6 4 0 4 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
1993 1 0 4 3 0 5 1 1 0 0 0 0 3 1
1994 3 0 4 0 0 1 0 0 3 1 2 1 0 1
1995 1 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0
1996 2 0 2 0 0 4 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
1997 0 0 5 0 1 2 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0
1998 1 1 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1999 0 0 1 3 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
Graph 6
Distribution of Types of Reorganisations by Industry
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Table 4. Distribution of Types of Reorganizations by Industry.
Type of reorganization
Industry
0 10 11 20 21 30 31 40 41 50 51 60 70 80 Total
Chemical 15 0 0 3 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 25
Coal 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
Construction
material 21 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 5 35
Electricity 19 2 0 2 2 1 1 0 0 1 0 3 1 4 38
Ferrous
metallurgy 10 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11
Food
processing 40 3 0 3 3 6 0 1 0 4 1 2 0 6 70
Forestry 12 1 0 4 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 25
Fuel 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Gas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Light 29 1 0 4 2 3 0 1 1 0 1 2 0 3 48
Machine
building 109 10 0 11 5 12 1 1 2 1 1 15 0 16 189
Non-ferrous
metallurgy 4 1 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 10
Oil extraction 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 4
Oil refining 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4
Other 20 1 0 0 2 1 0 3 0 0 0 3 0 3 34
Total 285 19 1 30 18 31 3 7 4 8 4 29 3 42 497
Graph 7
Distribution of Reorganizations by Industries
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Graph 8
Firms with Multiple Reorganizations, by Industry
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Graph 9
Reorganizations without Employment Changes
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Table 5. Employment Change with Reorganization.
Type of
reorganization Variable mean sd min p10 p50 p90 max N
Split-up Empl_before 2363.1 3708.9 168 231 601 7932 12248 13
 Employment change, % -43.5 27.4 -81 -80 -50 -7 -4 15
Spin-off (new) Empl_before 1392.5 1724.6 48 76 1173 3038 7509 22
 Employment change, % -33.5 18.3 -75 -60 -30 -10 -10 26
Spin-off (old) Empl_before 6403.8 21153.8 43 176 1308 6593 107226 25
 Employment change, % -22.1 21.9 -95 -65 -15 -4 -2 26
empl_before 2202.8 2561.7 43 176 1201 5300 10833 24
Employment change, % -22.2 22.3 -95 -65 -15 -4 -2 25
Merger Empl_before 1636.4 2775.6 108 108 160 6528 6528 5
 Employment change, % 119.5 145.7 8 8 68 400 400 6
empl_before 1636.4 2775.6 108 108 160 6528 6528 5
Employment change, % 63.4 54.2 8 8 35 139 139 5
Acquisition Empl_before 1797.2 2497.8 505 505 562 6785 6785 6
 Employment change, % 21.3 16.4 2 2 20 50 50 7
Graph 10
Employment Dynamics (from registry) by Type of Reorganisation
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Graph 11
Employment Dynamics (from survey) by Type of Reorganisation
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Table 6. Summary statistics.
Variable Mean by type of reorganization: mean sd min p50 max N
Organizational: no reorg break-up Integration Multiple
complex 0.76 0.76 0.66 0.76 0.754 0.174 0.189 0.810 0.939 497
new_supplier 0.64 0.71 0.91 0.62 0.644 0.479 0 1 452
hhi_input92 0.14 0.14 0.05 0.15 0.143 0.230 0.000 0.071 1.000 334
Hhi_input96 0.116 0.175 0.000 0.095 0.920 290
barter94 20.23 25.33 13.89 21.88 21.066 24.074 0.000 10.000 100.000 380
patent98 0.19 0.21 0.18 0.08 0.152 0.360 0.000 1.000 479
Market Structure:
hhi90 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.07 0.065 0.102 0.000 0.039 0.932 420
gini97 0.324 0.119 0.089 0.325 1.000 478
export 0.50 0.53 0.36 0.34 0.424 0.495 0 1 432
import 0.20 0.24 0.15 0.21 0.198 0.177 0.001 0.173 0.822 420
Governance:
manager_sh94 8.15 15.90 11.13 10.05 9.343 15.193 0.000 4.000 100.000 415
State_sh94 32.26 29.42 21.76 47.84 34.086 40.583 0.000 14.950 100.000 458
Other:
emp_log90 7.02 7.16 6.49 7.08 6.997 1.580 2.079 7.007 11.575 431
emp_log98 6.193 1.628 2.079 6.178 11.582 415
labpro_logdif90 -0.093 0.659 -3.750 -0.021 2.201 193
laborpro90 33.79 36.42 37.48 28.15 38.183 48.313 0.360 24.993 518.370 298
profit92 0.23 0.22 0.30 0.24 0.241 0.255 -1.575 0.209 3.022 391
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Table 7. Pairwise correlations.
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complex 1.000
new_supplier -0.047 1.000
0.320
hhi_input92 0.143 -0.022 1.000
0.009 0.700
hhi_input96 -0.060 0.110 0.890 1.000
0.312 0.068 0.000
barter94 0.064 0.018 0.025 -0.022 1.000
0.213 0.737 0.678 0.736
patent98 0.030 0.102 -0.025 0.020 -0.026 1.000
0.520 0.031 0.656 0.736 0.614
hhi90 0.050 0.017 0.118 0.259 0.009 0.071 1.000
0.310 0.735 0.046 0.000 0.880 0.154
gini97 -0.036 -0.032 -0.006 0.035 0.074 0.036 0.099 1.000
0.439 0.508 0.914 0.562 0.156 0.444 0.042
export 0.154 0.074 0.122 0.301 0.135 0.186 0.188 0.028 1.000
0.001 0.136 0.029 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.564
import 0.245 0.060 0.009 0.090 0.048 -0.005 0.102 -0.062 0.181 1.000
0.000 0.237 0.880 0.153 0.382 0.923 0.053 0.206 0.001
Manager_sh94 -0.039 0.009 -0.082 -0.129 0.077 -0.035 -0.070 -0.003 -0.089 -0.132 1.000
0.432 0.854 0.162 0.041 0.162 0.485 0.191 0.955 0.086 0.013
State_sh94 0.083 -0.124 0.152 0.171 -0.088 0.049 0.083 -0.077 -0.019 0.029 -0.399 1.000
0.076 0.011 0.007 0.005 0.094 0.306 0.103 0.107 0.699 0.565 0.000
emp_log90 0.154 0.055 0.114 0.296 0.092 0.175 0.241 -0.036 0.551 0.150 -0.140 0.023 1.000
0.001 0.272 0.048 0.000 0.087 0.000 0.000 0.458 0.000 0.003 0.007 0.648
emp_log98 0.111 0.025 0.176 0.254 0.069 0.263 0.167 -0.062 0.482 0.003 -0.179 0.024 0.888 1.000
0.024 0.626 0.002 0.000 0.208 0.000 0.002 0.218 0.000 0.961 0.001 0.631 0.000
labpro_logdif90 -0.043 0.084 -0.063 -0.093 0.024 0.075 0.043 0.053 0.104 0.097 0.047 -0.128 -0.025 -0.117 1.000
0.516 0.220 0.415 0.256 0.740 0.267 0.536 0.426 0.126 0.159 0.518 0.060 0.703 0.095
laborpro90 -0.231 0.007 0.009 0.007 -0.029 0.026 -0.071 -0.084 -0.026 -0.090 0.095 -0.017 -0.032 0.036 0.470 1.000
0.000 0.901 0.900 0.923 0.656 0.662 0.253 0.154 0.667 0.139 0.130 0.777 0.584 0.563 0.000
profit92 0.087 0.063 -0.001 0.064 -0.055 0.008 0.023 0.026 0.088 0.033 0.085 -0.057 0.090 0.088 0.197 -0.051 1
0.086 0.231 0.988 0.316 0.324 0.879 0.680 0.610 0.095 0.544 0.117 0.270 0.079 0.104 0.003 0.397
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Table 8. Factors of Reorganizations.
Multinomial logit Probit
break-ups M&A reorg_d
complex 0.095 0.283 0.029
(0.933) (0.889) (0.856)
new_supplier 0.361 1.684 0.082
(0.347) (0.085)+ (0.105)
hhi_input92 0.364 -0.975 0.044
(0.668) (0.659) (0.709)
barter94 0.01 -0.012 0.001
(0.195) (0.616) (0.275)
patent98 0.113 0.107 0.023
(0.778) (0.896) (0.691)
laborpro90 0.004 -0.002 0.001
(0.504) (0.803) (0.52)
profit92 -0.791 2.206 -0.064
(0.275) (0.178) (0.599)
Hhi90 2.602 -25.722 0.338
(0.132) (0.054)+ (0.172)
import 1.915 -0.878 0.223
(0.085)+ (0.7) (0.155)
export -0.346 0.09 -0.039
(0.416) (0.917) (0.531)
Manager_sh94 0.026 0.005 0.004
(0.008)** (0.795) (0.022)*
State_sh94 -0.003 -0.007 -0.001
(0.526) (0.494) (0.444)
emp_log90 0.065 0.066 0.01
(0.54) (0.23) (0.54)
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table 9. Vertical integration.
Supplier_block
complex -0.103
(0.001)**
Hhi_input96 -0.074
(0.047)*
patent98 0.119
(0.001)**
gini97 -0.270
(0.000)**
emp_log98 -0.003
(0.519)
Power and fuel 0.105
(0.100)+
Iron and steel, non-ferrous metals 0.364
(0.008)**
Chemicals and petrochemistry 0.164
(0.083)+
Forestry, woodworking, pulp and paper 0.236
(0.026)*
Construction materials 0.420
(0.009)**
Light industry 0.018
(0.627)
Food-processing 0.035
(0.336)
Other 0.063
(0.276)
Observations 260
pseudoR2 0.299
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Customer_block
complex -0.031
(0.791)
patent98 0.018
(0.646)
barter94 0.001
(0.071)+
gini97 0.176
(0.093)+
emp_log98 0.010
(0.361)
Power and fuel 0.151
(0.032)*
Iron and steel, non-ferrous metals 0.079
(0.356)
Chemicals and petrochemistry -0.020
(0.760)
Forestry, woodworking, pulp and paper 0.023
(0.800)
Construction materials 0.004
(0.947)
Light industry -0.045
(0.450)
Food-processing 0.097
(0.227)
Other 0.025
(0.772)
Observations 315
pseudoR2 0.078
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Graph 12. Labor Productivity After Reorganization
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Graph 13. Labor Productivity for Firms with no Reorganizations
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